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SHOCK: Unplanned Generation Outages DOUBLE After Introduction of Capacity Market; 13% of Total Capacity Supply Obligation Offline During Heatwave

January 21, 2014

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Copyright 2010-13 EnergyChoiceMatters.com
Reporting by Paul Ring • ring@energychoicematters.com

"The overall rate of unplanned outages across the entire New England generating fleet has more than doubled since 2007," ISO New England said in a filing at FERC.

The ISO's filing, detailed more fully in our related story today (click here), addresses the "failure" of the current capacity market to achieve reliability in a cost-effective manner.

Specifically, the ISO reported that EFORd rates are now 2.33 times higher than they were in 2007, and have been increasing as the capacity market ages. The first forward capacity auction was held in 2008, with delivery starting in 2010.

Annual New England EFORd Rates:
2007:                 3.78
2008:                 4.05
2009:                 3.78
2010:                 5.39
2011:                 5.77
2012:                 6.32
2013 (Jan-Aug):       8.83

And the performance problems for capacity suppliers are not just for gas-fired units refusing to prudently ensure an adequate supply of fuel to run when needed; the ISO has confirmed that it has a "fleet-wide problem" of poor performance from capacity suppliers.

Unavailability is trending upward in all generation categories except "other," and especially in the fossil steam category. "Notably, the analysis also shows that the combustion turbine category has deteriorating availability. This category includes units fueled by oil, kerosene, jet fuel, and natural gas, and represents a large portion of New England's fast-start generation. We are also seeing deteriorating availability with the internal combustion units, which include diesel-fired peaking units that operate infrequently. Increasing outages among these combustion turbine and peaking units are of particular concern because we rely on these units to ensure reliable operations during stressed system conditions, whether to meet summer peak demand or to respond rapidly to system contingencies that can occur any time of the year," the ISO said.

"[W]e've seen fleet-wide performance issues, as indicated in poor responses to the ISO's instructions following system contingencies, increasing EFORd rates, inadequate staffing of units, and the failure of oil units to maintain fuel inventories," the ISO said in testimony.

"Between January 2011 and November 2013, there were 78 hours in which there was a deficiency of either total ten minute reserves or total operating reserves (as measured by Energy Management System reserve requirements and designations) for some duration during the hour. In short, had generators with unplanned outages instead performed, they could have, in some cases, ameliorated or even eliminated reserve deficiencies," the ISO said.

The ISO gave the example of July 19, 2013, the sixth day of a heat wave during which temperatures exceeded 90°F on a daily basis in New England, with temperatures reaching 99°F in Boston on the 19th. "The extended nature of the heat wave led to many generator reductions due to ambient air temperature and environmental issues. The load in the peak hour from 4:00 to 5:00 p.m. was 27,377 MW, which is the fourth highest peak load in ISO history. In this hour, 4,265 MW of generation (13% of the total Capacity Supply Obligation for the month) was unavailable as a result of unplanned outages or reductions. Outages and reductions on this day resulted in an extended deficiency of operating reserves, which spanned six hours and peaked at around 700 MW of deficiency. ISO operators were required to implement Operating Procedure No. 4 ('Action During a Capacity Deficiency')," the ISO reported.

The ISO's filing includes testimony regarding reasons for non-performance, and should induce outrage among the millions of New England customers fleeced out of billions in the name of "reliability."

The following are examples quoted from the ISO's testimony:

"In January, a unit decreased its offer price for the next day during the reoffer period, after which it was committed. The ISO called the unit and the unit confirmed that it had gas ('gas is yes'). Three hours into the operating day, the ISO received a call from the unit that it would be coming offline because it had 'used up all [its] gas for the gas day.' When the ISO operator asked what had happened, he was told 'you guys called, we have it logged. You guys called numerous times making sure we had gas for the day ... and each time we call them [the participant's dispatch desk] they say, 'yes, tell them yes' and that's what we told you guys. I ... you know, I'm just the middle guy. I don't know what to tell you.'"

"In June, a unit received a day-ahead commitment, after which the ISO called to confirm that the unit had procured and scheduled gas. On the morning of the operating day, the ISO received a call from the unit's supplying gas pipeline, which expressed concern about the lack of gas scheduled for three units, including the committed unit. The ISO contacted all three plants to confirm they had gas, but did not hear back from the committed unit. A few hours later the unit called and reported 'gas constraints' that required it to reduce its output"

"In September, a participant submitted offers and was not committed day-ahead. When it was committed in the Reserve Adequacy Assessment process to satisfy operating reserve requirements, the unit stated that it could not procure enough fuel to make the run for operating reserves as committed, and its alternate fuel (oil) was unavailable as well. Later, the unit indicated that it could have burned the alternate fuel but chose not to because its offer did not reflect the higher fuel cost."

"Unfortunately, these incidents – in which generators dispatched in accordance with their offers renege because they haven't procured gas – have become commonplace. System operators can no longer be assured that offers are accurate, or that generators will perform when needed," testimony on behalf of the ISO said.

What Billions in Capacity Payments Buy: Shoestring-Operated Capacity Suppliers Unable to Dispatch Because No Staff is Present

Seven Years Later, Capacity Market Conceded by RTO To Be A "Failure"

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