Ohio Seeks Greater Comment on "Predatory" Electric Pricing, Retail "Market Power," in Retail Electric Market Investigation

The Public Utilities Commission of Ohio has issued another series of questions for stakeholder comment in its retail electric market investigation, including a series of questions regarding corporate separation among utilities and affiliates, and about "predatory" pricing and "market power" in the retail market.

Specifically, PUCO asked:

(a) Comments were filed suggesting that the relationship between an incumbent electric distribution utility (EDU) and a customer should be neither terminated nor encouraged. Does this comment pertain to distribution service or to generation service?

(b) If predatory pricing or other market factors become a barrier to a fully functional competitive retail electric service market, can and should the Commission regulate predatory pricing or other market factors?

(c) In a fully functional retail market, with no merchant or wholesale based default service, should the Commission and/or an independent market monitor have the ability to regulate market power?

(d) Regarding government aggregation, should the Commission require public disclosure of any information in addition to commodity pricing, such as inducements or incentives related to commodity contracts? In general, should the Commission require public disclosure of any information in addition to commodity pricing, such as inducements, incentives, or broker commission related to commodity contracts?

(e) Would a time-differentiated standard service offer (SSO) rate cause more shopping based upon customer preference for avoiding uncertainty?

(f) Are competitive retail electric service providers better positioned to manage uncertainty in a retail market than EDUs that offer a flat SSO rate?

(g) Is integrated resource planning compatible with a retail market construct? If yes, how can such planning be done, given the current construct of functionally separated business units? If no, how can investment in transmission, generation, and demand-management be co-optimized?

(h) Could integrated resource plans be done on a statewide basis? If so, how would such planning be accomplished? Could the Commission be helpful in facilitating this type of planning?

Additionally, with regards to corporate separation, PUCO asked:

(a) How can the Commission ensure that decisions made on behalf of the jurisdictional EDU are not providing preferential outcomes for non-regulated entities?

(b) Is there a corporate structure that will ensure decisions made by non-EDU affiliates minimize costs to ratepayers of the EDU?

(c) Since generation has been declared competitive in Ohio, should return on investment for EDUs be reduced in order to reflect lower risk?

(d) Should the capital structure of EDUs be more heavily weighted toward debt in light of the reduced risk associated with a wires-only company?

(e) FERC Order 1000 requires and/or enables regional transmission organizations to consider non-transmission options and merchant transmission options in their planning processes. Would a statewide integrated resource plan or shadow plan provide the market with guidance on where and/or how to make investments in conjunction with the PJM planning process?

(f) How could a competitive process be developed to provide all transmission developers, including incumbent transmission owners, with a fair chance to bid a transmission solution to a reliability problem identified by PJM?

(g) Should competitive bidding for transmission construction be considered in order to ensure the lowest possible cost?

(h) Does the current treatment of capacity injection rights adequately address units that retire and are later reactivated?

PUCO also rescheduled a workshop in the retail collaborative from June 25, 2013, to July 9, 2013.

Case No. 12-3151-EL-COI